This article interrogates what it considers to be several totalitarian moments in the process that led to the legislation that authorised same-sex marriage in South Africa. The interrogation proceeds from three platforms which also form the basis of any believable theory of democratic politics, namely church/state separation, plurality and common (shared) citizenship. My argument is that Parliament -by introducing (and defending) the first draft of the Civil Union Bill (which deliberately failed to introduce a marriage regime for same-sex life partnerships) in response to the Fourie judgment -failed properly to consider all three of these fundamental aspects of democracy. This failure was complemented by more overt totalitarian moves on the part of several fundamentalist religious groups in South Africa that (ironically so) vehemently opposed the first draft of the Bill even though it did not provide for same-sex marriage. I conclude that democratic activism coupled with the strength of and commitment to the South African Constitution and to the decisions of the Constitutional Court ensured the successful evasion of these totalitarian moments while emphasising that the struggle against totalitarianism in South Africa is far from over.
-the renowned Roman Empire 4 -which at the time still swore allegiance to a host of polytheistic deities of which the pagan gods Janus and Minerva were the most important. Seeing that the Christians' own highest authority decreed that the kingdom (state) of Christ was not of this world 6 and that one must give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, 7 the Christians, under these circumstances, easily came to believe and accept that human authority derived from God -which led to a dispensation according to which the church had no political existence other than an uncritical obedience towards state policy and principle. 8 In fact, Christianity starts off with nothing less than a declaration of independence: defining itself as disinterested, indifferent and neutral with regard to politics. 9 In 306, this pious dispensation changed radically when Constantine became the first Christian Roman emperor.
10 With this event, the Christian church and political rule became inseparably involved -consubstantial. 11 The emperor becomes the chosen man of God -the one who is not only to ensure political peace but also spiritual peace in men by bringing them to the service of God. 12 Because the church at the time had no unifying person or machinery, the emperor became the perfect fill for the void -both religious belief and state policy became embodied in the person of the head of state and with this a hopeless confusion took charge: The church becomes the state; the state becomes the church. Church-state. State-church.
At the time that Constantine came to power, rampant confusion reigned over the legal status of unions (consortia omni vitae) between slaves and free persons, which unions themselves -as a matter of frequency -were rampant. 13 One of the most characteristic elements of Constantine's rule was his re-criminalisation of mixed marriages between slaves and free persons according to which the offence became punishable by death.
14 Commentators have shown that this legislation was passed 'in an attempt to eradicate concubinage and to uphold a noble, 'Christian' ideal of marriage.' 
TOTALITARIANISM, (SAME-SEX) MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
In 162 Jan van Riebeeck (a Dutch Christian) arrives at the southern tip of Africa and the Cape Colony is founded with a prayer -followed by the quick realisation that the establishment of a refreshment station requires a whole lot of labour. 16 Unfortunately for Van Riebeeck, the Dutch East Indian Company (VOC) forbade the enslavement of the Khoi as a free people. 17 The solution to this was to import slaves from Angola and Dahomey. 18 Shortly after his arrival, Van Riebeeck founded the South African Dutch Reformed Church 19 which remained -right up to the abolition of slavery -uncritical of it, save for pronouncing that Christians could not be enslaved and that converted slaves had to be set free. 20 As was the case in the Roman Empire, marriage between a slave and a free person was absolutely prohibited and attracted the gravest of legal sanctions. 21 The first slave to be set free at the Cape, Catharina Anthonis, was set free in 166 because a free man, Jan Woutersz from Middelburg, wanted to marry her. 22 * On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler (a Christian man heavily influenced by occultist Aryanism) 23 became the chancellor of the third German reich. 24 Two years later, on 1 September 193, the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour was passed.
2 It absolutely prohibited the marriage of a Jew to a non-Jew. At the same time, the Reich Citizenship Law was passed which decreed that the Jews were no longer citizens of Germany. 26 With this move, Nazi totalitarianism received the stamp of legal authority, the force of law, total domination. The rest, as they say, is history. * In 1948, Daniel Francois Malan (a Dutch Reformed minister) becomes the first prime minister of apartheid.
27 Soon after this, the Dutch Reformed Church actively propagates the 'purist' conception of apartheid according to which total segregation between white and black South Africans is culturally essential for the survival of white 'civilization' in South Africa and politically necessary for the continuation of white rule. 28 This became known as the ideol- 41 For Arendt, the success of totalitarianism depends fundamentally on the concept of isolation, because it is isolation that serves as the precursor to loneliness and it is loneliness that provides the fertile breeding ground for terror. 42 Totalitarian domination 'bases itself … on the experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man.' 43 Indeed, totalitarianism can always be exposed by examining the continuous, debilitating and terrifying interference by the state in the private, social aspects of citizens' lives as well as state regulation of non-state social institutions 44 so as to compromise the freedom to act which will ensure (and promote) the loneliness of human beings. This loneliness is different from solitude in that the one who is lonely is subjected to the torture of being amongst others with whom she may not establish contact or to whose hostility she is exposed. 4 In South Africa, the Constitutional Court has in fact recognised the promotion of loneliness as an aspect of past totalitarian rule. In abolishing the legal provisions that criminalised consensual, anal penetrative sex between two men Sachs J held that with the abolition of this crime, 'a section of the community can feel the equal concern and regard of the Constitution and enjoy lives less threatened, less lonely and more dignified' 46 than they were under the apartheid order.
Johan van der Vyfer points out that the 'distinct bias for (a certain brand of) Christianity' was one of the aspects that denoted the fabric of the apartheid regime as totalitarian. 47 This religious bias was in fact an essential ingredient of the apartheid government's totalitarian recipe. As is the case with all the examples cited in the preface, the church-state consubstantiality (in different permutations that are all the while more and more similar) provides a religious reason for the political perpetration of isolation and eventually loneliness that is required for terror to thrive. This particular brand of totalitarianism -one in which the church and the state remain literally inseparable and the church 40 H Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966, 198) at the behest of the state in the perpetration of human loneliness -is the totalitarianism par excellence.
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It is thus also no coincidence, as well as being a recurring motif of history (as the preface also aims to show), that a state wishing to institutionalise totalitarian domination will always have some form of prohibitive, hegemonic or coercive marriage law on its agenda, be it the prohibition of slave/free marriage, Jew/nonJew marriage, black/white marriage or the forced marriage of the Taliban which effectively prohibits a woman from exercising the choice to marry or not. All of these practices are totalitarian aims at isolation; aims to instil the sense that one no longer belongs to the world of the 'human being' 49 because one is not considered human because of who and what one immutably is. It is precisely because Arendt realised that totalitarianism's affinity for loneliness is vividly exhibited in its prohibitive laws in relation to marriage, that she argued in her later essay, 'Reflections on Little Rock', 0 that the right to marry whoever one wishes 1 is an elementary human right -a right that derives from our shared human existence.
It would indeed be dangerously complacent to believe that the all-consuming fire of totalitarianism is extinguishable by the torrent of formal democratic rule. Such a belief would always be founded in a confusion of totalitarianism with totalitarian rule. Even in a country that harbours the most advanced and sophisticated institutions of democracy (and thus guards vehemently against totalitarian rule), totalitarianism will lurk, organise, even proliferate. In this article, I will critique the totalitarian aspects (totalitarianism) of the process that led to the enactment of same-sex marriage in South Africa. I will do this with reference to specifically three focus points which also happen to form essential parts of the core of any believable theory of democracy, namely church/state separation, 3 to be with us, even in the most secure democracies, but they no longer take their mid-twentieth century forms.' 3 To clarify, 'church' and 'state' as I use the words here are intended to have a broad meaning. With 'church/state separation' I intend to indicate not only the state's separation from the Christian church but also a distancing from any particular religion in a way that leads to the state's tolerance for religion but without any particular religious bias. The phrase 'church-state' would thus serve as a signifier referring to religious belief (intolerance?) practised as politics in the body of, for instance, the head of state (as is the case with President George Bush). I should stress from the outset that church/state separation as I use it here does not necessarily or inevitably preclude the even-handed treatment by the state of religions in a democracy -as is enjoined by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the 'Constitution').
TOTALITARIANISM, (SAME-SEX) MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS moral citizenship. 4 My primary argument will be that Parliament continuously failed properly to heed all three of these fundamentals in the course of affording comprehensive legal protection -in the form of marriage -to same-sex couples. I regard these failures properly to heed the fundamentals of democracy not merely as negations of the political. Rather, I will suggest that these failures are in fact positive attempts grounded in totalitarianism. The configuration that emerges on this account cannot but confront the totalitarian moments -as totalitarian moments -that is to say not just as anti-democratic or politically vacuous moments -within the overtly democratic process that led to the recognition of same-sex marriage in South Africa.
As part of plausibly making this argument it will be necessary to enquire not only into the South African character of the three fundamental democratic concepts identified below but also into the way in which they have been employed and developed by the Constitutional Court to undo the legacy of our totalitarian past. It will then become necessary to interrogate the role these fundamentals of democracy played on different political sides during the LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered and Intersexed) liberation process in South Africa.
As is probably already clear, the theoretical framework that I propose (and support) here is heavily influenced by the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. I will argue (as Arendt did) that the right to choose to marry whoever one pleases (or not to marry at all) 6 is not only fundamental to a person's life -it is also an essential ingredient in all struggles against the fundamentalist extremism that ceaselessly seeks the establishment of a totalitarian world order. However, (and for this fact there will be no apology), the voices that speak here are also those of Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière and Jacques Derrida for the reason that it is their thinking (in the wake of totalitarianism) that demands a radicalisation of the democratic thought of the Left in a way that recognises and creatively resists the totalitarian potential of every new democratic day. It is because of my concern -in the context and in the course of the same-sex marriage debate in South Africa -with and for what Jacques Rancière has called the 'hatred of democracy' 7 that I believe it to be indispensable, as a matter of resistance, to link this debate to the conditions of politics and the nature of the South African democracy as not any democracy 4 To be sure, these are of course not the only fundamentals of democracy. The Rule of Law, for instance, constitutes a widely considered fundamental of democracy that I will not directly discuss here. The reason for this relates primarily to the nature and consequences of the church/state separation that will be discussed here. Briefly, this discourse holds that the separation of the heteronymous (religious) order from the autonomous (political) order that is implied in the phrase 'church/state separation' leads to a political order that is, as a matter of its constitution and right from that moment, ruled by law -its own law. This is the original meaning of autonomy and the political as autonomous. In this way, church/state separation precedes the rule of law and on this understanding the rule of law is not an independent fundamental of democracy. III chuRch/state sePaRatIon and the 'PolItIcs' of same-sex maRRIage
In south afRIca According to Jean-Luc Nancy, the separation of church and state is not one political possibility amongst others -it is the constitutive element of politics as such. 8 The politics that Nancy speaks of is politics in the ancient sense -politics that bears an intimate relation with democracy.
9 Today, the assertion that 'the separation of church and state is a cornerstone of democracy' is almost as trite as asserting that the sky is blue. As Nancy contends, the separation is so fundamental to the very concept of demo-cracy 60 that it has become a given. 61 It is this 'obviousness' of the separation between church and state for democracy that often leaves the nature of the separation itself uninterrogated.
Given the oppressive history of the apartheid government, its promotion of, exclusively, 'a Christian way of life' 62 and its cosy relationship with the three Afrikaans 'sister' churches, it was imperative for the South African Constitution explicitly to arrange a separation of church and state that would not only ensure the legitimacy of the Constitution but would also put in place what Sachs J called in the Fourie 63 judgment, the 'mutual co-existence of the sacred and the secular'. 64 This particular dispensation (as opposed to a strict church/state separation) was also required because of the high incidence of religious affiliation in South Africa.
6
In accordance with a notion that could be termed 'tolerant separation', the vision of the new constitutional order (as a secular democratic order) holds that the state will never again employ the mechanisms of religion to indoctrinate political ideology. The obvious implication, of course, necessitates a commitment that the South African state would never again show a distinct bias for any particular religious conviction, denomination or brand. Because of the high incidence of religious affiliation in South Africa, the drafters of the Constitution wanted, however, to avoid the problems of too strict a church/state separation. These problems often exist around objections that too strict a separation of church and state leads to the increasing marginali- sation of religion in society so that the right to freedom of religion becomes a right to freedom from religion. 66 Read together with ss 9(3), 67 18 68 and 31(1) 69 of the Constitution, the freedom of religion regime in South Africa thus entails that everyone has the right to the free exercise of religion, belief and opinion and that no one has the right unfairly to discriminate against a person on the grounds of religion. Moreover, the state is enjoined to treat religions even-handedly, refraining from any particular religious bias. South Africa's freedom of religion regime (read with the right to freedom of expression 70 which prohibits hate speech) of course also entails that the religious beliefs of some cannot be used to silence the expression of religious beliefs (or beliefs about religion) held by others -to the extent that the expression of religious beliefs of one religion (or the beliefs about religion of some) cannot reasonably be construed as advocacy of hate speech based on religion in terms of s 16(2)(c).
71 But perhaps more importantly for current purposes, as Sachs J held in the Fourie matter, the religious beliefs of some cannot be used to determine the constitutional rights of others. 72 This must be so not merely because the constitutional rights of persons are created by the political, secular order (the state) but also because of the more foundational notion that relates to the very nature of the political as autonomous 73 -ruled by the laws that come from itself. As Nancy emphasises, the only religion that is proper to a democracy is religion without theocracy. 74 But many (and certainly not all) of the religions of democracy (in the sense of them being in democracy) are never fully able to accept this castration. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.' 68 'Everyone has the right to freedom of association.' 69 'Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.' 70 Constitution s 16(1): 'Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes-(a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.' 71 'The right in subsection (1) does not extend to-…(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.' 72 Fourie (note 63 above) para 92. 73 Nancy (note 8 above) makes the point that the political gives itself its own laws. It is thus autonomous (from the Greek auto (self) and nomos (law)) or self-legislative. On the other hand, religion is by definition heteronomous: God (the one who is wholly heteros/other) gives the law. Nancy's strict distinction is perhaps too idealistic and is perhaps also open to ethical charges rooted in Derrida's work on messianism without a messiah or the heteronomy of the Other. This is a matter that I cannot address here save for pointing out that the very autonomy of the political necessarily already points to an ethic beyond it and thus, in a certain sense, emphasises the aporetic relation of the ethical to the political. 74 Nancy (note 8 above) .
Melancholically obsessed with the loss of their rule over the demos (others), some of these religions (of democracy) often continue to tout theocracy. The other side of the coin all too often becomes Rancière's notion of the hatred of democracy. As Rancière argues, democracy is synonymous with abomination for those who still believe that revelations of divine law constitute 'the sole legitimate foundation on which to organise human communities'.
7 Such religions become political as well as religious, or, to put it differently, their practice becomes religion as a politics.
76 For Arendt, these religions are not authentic because authentic religions are religions that are not of the political world but part of the private world and, although the free world should permit and even encourage them plurally, religious belief should not be allowed to be adapted for the purposes of political ideology. 77 As she notes in her 193 essay on religion and politics:
If we try to inspire public-political life once more with 'religious passion' or to use religion as a means of political distinctions, the result may very well be the transformation and perversion of religion into an ideology and the corruption of our fight against totalitarianism by a fanaticism which is utterly alien to the very essence of freedom.
78
The desire for theocracy (or perhaps more accurately, the primordial tension between theocracy and democracy -which is always already the fundamental tension between the heteronymous and the autonomous) is sure to present itself forcefully during the process by which a secular order purports to change the heterosexual definition of marriage as the lifelong union between a man and a woman. With the sincerely held but hopelessly confused belief that marriage is fundamentally a religious (theocratic) institution (rather than a secular, civil arrangement), 79 an overwhelming majority of religious institutions right from the beginning of the struggle for same-sex marriage in South Africa (and elsewhere) vehemently opposed it. 80 This opposition sowed the seeds of totalitarianism in that it constituted an attempt not only to deny certain humans their dignity or to curtail a basic freedom of human beings -it also attempted (once again) politically to delegitimise the sexuality of TOTALITARIANISM, (SAME-SEX) MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS some so that they would once more be driven into the darkness of invisibility and would once again be successfully isolated and thus susceptible to the debilitation on which terror insists. The presumptuousness of the religious opposition to same-sex marriage specifically in South Africa -one could even go so far as to say the fanatical desire for theocracy or absolute heteronomy -completely ignored the fact that our Constitution (the source of our political order and thus also the source of the autonomy of such an order) prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. 81 This political practice (politicisation) of religion led to an abuse of the generous rights afforded to religious groupings by the Constitution. The tolerance and even-handed treatment of religion envisaged by the Constitution turned into the permission of religious groupings to espouse hate speech against those who do not share their religious views about love, sexuality and sexual orientation. 82 But perhaps most importantly, the presumptuousness of this practice of religion as hegemonic politics was founded in a disdainful intolerance all too characteristic of radical totalitarianism, namely the disdainful intolerance for that which is constitutive of distinctively human 83 life -plurality.
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IV PluRalIty, equalIty, dIgnIty … and fReedom
(a) Plurality, equality and dignity
In The Human Condition Arendt writes that plurality is 'the condition -… -of all political life'. 8 For her, plurality is both the conditio sine qua non and per quam of political life and as such it is what guards most successfully against the success of totalitarianism, 86 primarily because plurality does not politically conceive the concept of the human being in a monistic way. Human being is for Arendt politically conceivable only as the plurality of human beings. There are many places in her work where she emphasises that men (different people and peoples) (not man) 87 inhabit the world and that the preparation for totalitarianism has begun when people (through terror and tyranny) lose contact with their fellow men.
88 For Arendt plurality is fundamental to 81 See Constitution s 9(3) (note 67 above). 82 See the discussion of these aspects in more detail below. 83 Hamacher (note 9 above) 343 indicates that for the ancient Greeks political society is constitutive of the human. human life because it is plurality (the existence of other, different people in the world) that validates our experiences as reality. Even more importantly, it is plurality that enables us to think, 89 which thus distinguishes us as human. And tyrannical forms of government destroy absolutely the plurality of peoples amongst others and amongst themselves.
In the course of its jurisprudence on freedom of religion, our Constitutional Court has touched on plurality as a cornerstone of democratic politics. In the Christian Education 90 case, the Court held that the provisions of the Constitution that protect the rights of members of communities (specifically s 12) 'underline the constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and pluralism in our society.' 91 These provisions affirm the right of people to be who they are without being forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, and highlight the importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy what has been called 'the right to be different'.
92
The Court went on to affirm the right to depart from a general norm and celebrated the 'rich tapestry constituted by civil society'. 93 It continued to deal explicitly with the importance of protecting members of minority groups in society and acknowledged that minorities might well be 'specially reliant on constitutional protection, particularly if they express their beliefs in a way that the majority regard as unusual, bizarre or even threatening. 96 As part of the respect for and maintenance of plurality, held the Court, it is particularly important to be conscious of past practices that abused the notion of plurality 'to achieve exclusivity, privilege and domination.'
97
Outside its limited freedom of religion jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court has, on a number of occasions, confirmed the importance of plurality for the transformation of South African civil society. 98 In National Coalition Ackermann J explicitly linked plurality with the constitutional guarantee of equality and opposed it to the totalitarian South African past: 'The desire for equality is not a hope for the elimination of all differences. "The experience of subordination -of personal subordination, above all -lies behind the vision of equality."'
100
The linking of plurality with equality in a way that affirms difference is markedly Arendtian (although seldom attributed to her). In The Human Condition she writes that '[p]lurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.' 101 The first National Coalition judgment marks the Court's strongest, 102 unequivocal affirmation that plurality fundamentally depends on difference, that equal respect for difference is at the heart of equality 103 and that equality depends, in great part, on the protection of minorities:
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like 'us' is entitled to equality. Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those who are 'different' from us in some way should have the same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet as soon as we say any … group is less deserving and unworthy of equal protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all of … society are demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so devastatingly injurious to say that those who are handicapped or of a different race, or religion, or colour or sexual orientation are less worthy.
104
Per Sachs J the Court also emphasised that the Constitution does not presuppose that a holder of rights is an isolated, lonely and abstract figure possessing a disembodied and socially disconnected self. It acknowledges that people live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their places and their times.
10
The Court also considered that social minorities (in this case the South African LGBTI community) constitute political minorities, meaning that they cannot depend on political power to secure favourable legislation. Accordingly, they are almost exclusively dependant on the Bill of Rights for protection.
106 This is a point that Arendt emphasised already in a 194 essay in which she attempted to come to terms with totalitarianism; namely that a 99 Note 46 above. 100 Prinsloo (note 98 above) para 22 (footnote omitted). 101 Arendt (note 2 above) 8.
See the earlier judgment in The President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997
(4) SA 1 (CC) para 41: 'At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.' 103 National Coalition (note 46 above) para 112. 104 Ibid para 22. 10 Ibid para 117. 106 Ibid para 2. democracy ruled by majority decisions but unchecked by the rule of law is as despotic as an autocracy.
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In the instant judgment, the Court went so far as to hold that the success of the entire constitutional endeavour will be measured by how successfully it reconciles sameness and differences, 108 which I read as a different way of saying that the success of the entire constitutional endeavour will depend on how successfully it nurtures plurality. 109 In an obiter statement Sachs J also highlighted that the protection of dignity under s 10 'offers protection to persons in their multiple identities and capacities.' 110 Plurality thus sits at the heart of the constitutional endeavour: '[w]hat the Constitution requires is that the law and public institutions acknowledge the variability of human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that should be shown to all as they are.'
111
The Court was careful to point out that plurality as a condition of politics certainly does not entail that anything goes. 112 It pointed out that the Bill of Rights is a document of deep political morality and its enforcement itself is an enforcement of morality. 113 The Court, however, affirmed that the morality that the state enforces through the Bill of Rights is a secular morality: 'the dictates of the morality which it enforces, and the limits to which it may go, are to be found in the text and spirit of the Constitution itself.' 114 Above everything, the first National Coalition judgment is, in the end, a judgment that celebrates plurality as the heart of the political.
11 For this reason it is fundamentally a judgment about the nature of and conditions for democratic politics, which is the only politics worthy of the name.
(b) Plurality, marriage and family formation in South Africa
From the outset of the constitutional endeavour, the Constitutional Court has acknowledged the plurality that inheres in modern South African family formations. In the First Certification case 116 the Court acknowledged that families are constituted, function and are dissolved in a variety of ways, and that laws or executive action resulting in enforced marriages, or oppressive prohibitions on marriage or the choice of spouses, would not survive constitutional 107 118 where the Court also affirmed that 'it is not for the state to choose or to arrange the choice of [marriage] partner, but for the partners to choose themselves.' Underlying this proscription is, of course, a very well-developed concern with plurality; an acknowledgment that marriage partners come in all shapes and sizes and that the choice to marry a particular person is a highly personal one. Later, in the Du Toit case, 119 Skweyiya J emphasised that family life as contemplated by the Constitution could be provided in a variety of different ways all worthy of constitutional protection.
In Fourie the Court explicitly acknowledged that the extension of marriage to permanent same-sex life partnerships was a matter of the protection of equality and dignity and thus of plurality. 120 The opening of the institution of marriage was thus also a distinctively democratic political gesture that affirmed the rule of law and celebrated secularity.
The reasons for the extension of specifically 'marriage' to the LGBTI community -as a matter of plurality -relate primarily to the importance (centrality) attributed to marriage in South African civil society. Throughout its jurisprudence on marriage, the Court has acknowledged the argument that marriage is central to the distribution of benefits in politics and that it is only because marriage is one of the central territories of cultural privilege that it becomes an important site of exclusion. 121 In Dawood 122 O'Regan J held that marriage and the family are social institutions of vital importance not only because of their personal significance but also because 'human beings are social beings whose humanity is expressed through their relationships with others'.
123
As emphasised in Fourie, the words 'I do' have both an intensely private and an overtly public (political in the ancient sense) dimension to them. 124 The public dimension prescribes certain formalities for the marriage in order to ensure the publication of the marriage to the broader community -'marriage' is thus taken seriously not only by the parties, their families and society, but [ 126 And, under a Constitution that recognises plurality as one of its political foundations, the politics of the family will have to announce itself constrained (or perhaps informed) by this very notion of plurality.
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage as a pillar of civil society is thus 'not a small and tangential inconvenience resulting from a few surviving relics of societal prejudice destined to evaporate like the morning dew.'
127
It represents a harsh statement that same-sex unions are not worthy of the same protection because they do not conform to the heterosexual norm.
However, the Constitutional Court has been careful to point out that the opening-up of marriage does not constitute a hegemonic attempt to make same-sex couples conform to the heterosexual norm. 128 This would invariably reduce the plurality that the Constitution aims to protect. What was in issue was both the legitimacy of families constituted in ways different from the heterosexual norm as well as the choice that was available to such families. In short: Given the centrality of marriage in our society, '[i]f heterosexual couples have the option of deciding whether to marry or not, so should same-sex couples,' 129 because there is no rational justification that could form the basis of their exclusion from the institution that carries this appellation. Any different outcome would have resulted in a denial of equality, difference and thus of plurality.
The Fourie judgment deferred the opening-up of marriage to include samesex life partnerships to the legislature for a period of one year from the date of the judgment. 130 This deferral stood in sharp contrast to the Constitutional Court's overt counter-totalitarian acknowledgment of the secular, inclusive and plural dimensions throughout its jurisprudence on sexual freedom and the institution of marriage. For when all was said and done, South Africa's LGBTI society had to live for up to another year with the denial of their dignity, equality and freedom. The realisation that this was the practical effect of the majority's judgment lay at the heart of O'Regan J's dissent, which recognised that the majority's order not only deviated from the important constitutional principle that successful litigants must generally be afforded the relief they seek. 131 As O'Regan J frankly noted, the real practical effect of the majority's decision, after all, was that gay and lesbian couples would not be permitted to marry during the period of suspension of the order. 132 This order was also particularly problematic in that it failed to confront the historical fact that the state had opposed all the cases in which constitutional relief was sought for the LGBTI community. 133 In addition, given the Constitutional Court's explicit confrontation with the religious views of the majority of the population, a hiatus in the judgment suggests a failure to come to terms with the possible consequences of deferring to the legislative process within this political context, namely that it is precisely the judgment that created the space for the expression of these religious views during public participation. To be sure, the Constitutional Court cannot be blamed for the fact that Parliament allowed the expression of homophobic religious views during public participation. This, however, does not absolve the Court's responsibility to consider the probable consequences -the fact that it is probable that more unjustifiable harm could come to the LGBTI community -which result from the suspension of the order.
Given the history of the state's role in the preceding litigation, it was perhaps not surprising that Parliament's response to the Fourie judgment bore the distinct characteristics of totalitarianism in the making. Why is this not a far-fetched contention? Let us recall that in Fourie the Court expressly stated that any remedy that would lead to a 'separate but equal' marriage regime for same-sex couples would not only hark back to the tactics of the totalitarian apartheid government, it would for this very reason be 'unthinkable' 134 in our constitutional order. 13 Yet this is precisely the regime that Parliament proposed in the first draft of the Civil Union Bill.
136 This Bill did not provide marriage to same-sex life partnerships but instead sought to enact a second-class institution called a 'civil partnership' regime exclusively for same-sex couples. 137 With the proposal of this Bill the writing was on the wall that the political will was (at best) reluctant to grant equal rights of marriage to same-sex couples. A further implication of this move was that the legislature itself (albeit tacitly and perhaps even unconsciously) expressed an intolerance for the plurality of South African society so celebrated by the Constitutional Court. It is for this reason that the Bill was met with the outrage it deserved from the South African LGBTI society.
138
But coming back to where the previous section left off, what was even more alarming was the intolerance for plurality expressed by the members of numerous religious groups. 139 While the LGBTI society regarded the Bill as an insult in that it did not go far enough, religious groups regarded it as a moral disaster because, in their opinion, it went too far. 140 While it was clear that the Bill was not allowing same-sex marriage, religious groups argued that even granting civil partnerships to same-sex couples would defile the institution of marriage, which they believed to be sacred. 141 Instead of informing these groups that (1) the Constitutional Court had already dealt with and dismissed -as a constitutional or political matter -the religious arguments against same-sex marriage; and (2) the Bill was in fact not providing marriage to same-sex couples, Parliament instead provided these religious groupings (as part of the legislative process) with a platform from which to express some of the most ludicrous, hurtful and unfounded opinions about same-sex love that have ever been conceived -all based on naked and irrational hatred (yes, hatred, not benign naiveté based on the reading of religious text and belief in its authority) of those who wish to act out their homosexuality. 142 Arendt suggests that when hatred starts playing a central role in public affairs (as it did in this case), democratic politics is under threat and totalitarianism is at the political door. 143 The religious groupings that decided to voice their opposition in the form of hate speech neither cared for, nor did they value or even come to accept, the equal respect for plurality that lies at the heart of this constitutional order. Moreover, they failed to appreciate the simple fact that they are religions of democracy -tolerated, even encouraged, but never licensed to determine the constitutional rights of others.
V cItIzenshIP: the RIght to haVe RIghts Arendt famously argued that only the concrete rights of citizens carried weight.
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She believed that the danger in describing human rights as inalienable exists in basing them in an abstract individual who exists nowhere.
14 Her unease with such a description of human rights must be viewed in the context of her discussion of totalitarianism. The isolation required for the success of totalitarianism cannot be fully implemented without the annihilation of the common citizenship of the polity. Taking away a political subject's citizenship serves as a shortcut by way of which the subject's other human rights are alienated (save to the extent that these rights are retained in the abstract sense) because those rights largely depend on (and are grounded in) citizenship for their enforcement.
Because of her concern with the protection of plurality as the condition of all true politics, Arendt insisted that the equal granting of the status of citizenship is the very condition for the protection of such plurality. To put it differently, according to Arendt's formulation, I need to have citizenship like everyone else in order to protect my individual status as one who is 'like' no one. 146 Thus, the very fact that we are all human entitles us to the citizenship with which we are ensured of our human rights. 147 Without it, our human rights are literally and ceaselessly exposed to alienation.
Arendt notes that the totalitarianism of the twentieth century brutally indicated exactly how alienable the so-called inalienable rights are when they are not grounded in citizenship.
148 This is what Hitler realised in Nazi Germany when he decreed that all Jews were no longer German citizens. This is also what the apartheid government realised with the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 26 of 1970 which decreed the removal of the South African citizenship of black people and compelled them to become citizens of the homeland that responded to their ethnic group, regardless of whether they had ever lived there or not.
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Of course, the so-called 'independent' homelands remained under the practical control of the apartheid government and thus served primarily as the loci to which black South Africans were relegated after the apartheid government divested them of their South African citizenship and the rights (particularly in terms of politics and civility) that such a citizenship would attract.
The premise upon which the exclusion from citizenship -as a denial of human rights -of Jews and black people was based under totalitarianism generally, consisted in the general belief of the members of the totalitarian movement/s that these human beings were (at best) less human than them and thus not entitled to the same common (shared) 10 citizenship. This belief in the 'less human', for its part, was founded on the idea that the Jews in the case of Germany and the black people in the case of South Africa did not possess the same moral and ethical capacity that the oppressors believed themselves to have been born with. In short, the citizenship of these people was excluded because of the belief that they were morally inferior and thus not deserving of the same citizenship as those who were supposedly 'superior'. For this reason, the oppressors in South Africa, for instance, thought it necessary to segregate society along racial lines.
From a purely formal (and immensely important) point of view, the South African Constitution ensured that it would never again be possible (after the disintegration of apartheid) legally to conceive of the exclusion of some South Africans from South African citizenship. There is now a common South African citizenship affirmed by the Constitution.
11 Because the right to citizenship is linked with equality, there can be no classes of citizenship in South Africa. This was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in Hugo where it held that '"distinctions that treat certain people as second-class citizens, that demean them, that treat them as less capable for no good reason, or that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity" cannot be tolerated.'
13 Currie and De Waal correctly indicate that only citizens enjoy the political rights of the Constitution. Thus if South African people did not formally have the right to claim equal status as citizens, it would be impossible for them to negotiate the required agency that is needed to play their equal roles in the political realm.
14 Out of the importance Arendt placed on common citizenship (as shared, equal citizenship) she discerned her notion of civic friendship which affirms the two dimensions of her conception of the public sphere, namely the space of appearance and the enormity of the idea of sharing a common world.
1 The space of appearance endorses, gives ontological significance to plurality. 16 The common world provides some permanence to the always precarious space of appearance; it is the backdrop: 'a shared and public world of human artefacts, institutions and settings which separates us from nature and which provides a relatively permanent and durable context for our activities.' 17 The denial of equal citizenship thus threatens the very possibility of politics and a public sphere as such because it renders the recovery of a common, shared world impossible.
Arendt's conception of citizenship as sharing a common world is perhaps best captured by Nancy's notion of the partage -that which indicates sharing at the same time as it indicates division or separation, 18 or as Derrida puts it, 'at once partition and participation, something possible only on the basis of an irreducible spacing.' 19 Arendt herself compares the common world to sitting around a table with others -'the world, like any in-between, relates and separates men at the same time'.
160 For Arendt totalitarianism destroys the space between people and thereby destroys the very heart of civic friendship. Under totalitarianism, sharing (the partage) is no longer a possibility. It is also when this sharing is destroyed that freedom lies in ruins, because freedom (as that which 'throws the subject into the space of the sharing of being') cannot be experienced without this space between men. 161 Moreover, because equality is integral to freedom in that the equal sharing of freedom is its unconditional condition, the destruction of the TOTALITARIANISM, (SAME-SEX) MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS space between men also ruins equality 162 and, seeing that equality bears such an intimate relationship with human dignity in South Africa, the destruction of equality leads to the ruination of dignity. Under the crushing force of the iron band of terror the great emancipatory ideals collapse like dominoes.
Well aware of this domino effect, Arendt's notion of 'thick' citizenship pleads for more than the mere formal granting of equal (common) citizenship. It is Arendt's notion of citizenship as the acknowledgment of worth;
163 of the full and active (and thus equal right to) participation in the public sphere that has been developed by the Constitutional Court (primarily by Sachs J) and referred to as 'full moral citizenship'. Sachs J famously opened his judgment in the first National Coalition case with the following words:
Only in the most technical sense is this a case about who may penetrate whom where. At a practical and symbolical level it is about the status, moral citizenship and sense of self-worth of a significant section of the community. At a more general and conceptual level, it concerns the nature of the open, democratic and pluralistic society contemplated by the Constitution. 164 Sachs J went on to hold that '[i]n the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the scarring comes not from poverty or powerlessness, but from invisibility'. 16 The judgment repeatedly acknowledges that the discrimination against the LGBTI community exists as an attempt to erase their space of appearance.
166 By casting this case as being about full moral citizenship, appearance and plurality (rather than just about privacy), Sachs J affirmed that the decriminalization of homosexual conduct and the granting of equal rights to the LGBTI community are fundamental ingredients for nurturing the profundity of full common citizenship for South African democracy and politics. Sachs J's notion of moral citizenship also acknowledges that the formal extension and enjoyment of a common citizenship is but a precondition (albeit a very important one) of moral citizenship: 'The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people as they are.' 167 In Fourie Sachs J built on this notion of equal moral citizenship by holding that:
The strength of the nation envisaged by the Constitution comes from its capacity to embrace all its members with dignity and respect. In the words of the Preamble, South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in diversity. What is at stake in this case, then, is how to respond to legal arrangements of great social significance under which same-sex couples are made to feel like outsiders who do not fully belong in the universe of equals. 168 162 Derrida (note 9 above); Rancière (note 9 above) 84-91. 163 National Coalition (note 46 above) para 127. Sachs J specifically links the acknowledgment of full moral citizenship to the acknowledgment of the innate self-worth of human beings (dignity). 164 Ibid para 107. 16 Ibid para 127. 166 Ibid para 128: 'Gays constitute a distinct though invisible section of the community that has been treated not only with disrespect or condescension but with disapproval and revulsion; they are not generally obvious as a group, pressurised by society and the law to remain invisible.' 167 Ibid para 134 (author's emphasis). 168 Fourie (note 63 above) para 61.
Given the importance of marriage in South African society and the Court's acknowledgment of the centrality of marriage, its extension to same-sex permanent life partnerships thus became a matter of acknowledging not merely the unfairness of the discrimination. It was also an acknowledgment of the equal moral citizenship of the members of the South African LGBTI society. Furthermore, it was an affirmation by the Constitutional Court that a family constituted by a same-sex couple has the same potential and ability to produce good citizens as any heterosexual family.
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Unfortunately though, Parliament's first draft of the Civil Union Bill was less accommodating. With the Bill's civil partnership provisions, it blatantly attempted to introduce a second class (moral) citizenship. 170 The Bill reserved a civil partnership for same-sex life partnerships by defining it as 'the voluntary union of two adult persons of the same sex', 171 while simultaneously making it clear that the Marriage Act would be retained exclusively for heterosexual marriages. 172 This constituted an overt attempt to segregate same-sex couples from their heterosexual counterparts on no rational grounds whatsoever. The drafters themselves in fact implicitly acknowledged that civil partnerships are of a second class or inferior. This was evident from the provisions of s 11 of the Bill which allowed for the civil partnership to be called a marriage only upon the occasion of solemnization, thus indicating that a special 'indulgence' would be granted to call the inferior partnership a marriage at least once. From this deduction it followed that there was no room for an interpretation that civil partnerships are equal to marriage.
The illegitimacy of a civil partnership regime in South Africa (legislated in the absence of a choice to marry for same-sex partners) was already acknowledged by the South African Law Reform Commission at the time that the first draft of the Civil Union Bill was introduced. 173 The civil partnership provisions could thus not have been anything other than a deliberate and overt attempt to introduce a 'separate but equal' marriage regime in South Africa in direct contravention of what was said in Fourie. 174 These provisions would not and could not ensure that same-sex couples would be accorded the equal private and public status afforded by marriage. 17 Considering the provisions of this Bill together with the voting majority's religious outrage against any form of legal recognition for same-sex life partnerships, it became clear that the first draft of the Civil Union Bill desperately attempted to negotiate between the prevailing public sentiment on the one hand, and the tenor of the Constitutional Court's judgment and the interests it vindicated on the other. Viewed from these sides respectively, in passing an Act in the form of the first draft of the Civil Union Bill Parliament would not be granting marriage but at least it would be giving 'full' legal protection to same-sex couples.
But the underlying ideology that inhered in this particular attempt at negotiation was that the members of the LGBTI society of South Africa could be deemed not to be equal citizens because they are morally inferior and thus do not deserve access to the special institution of marriage. In light of the effect of the Du Toit case, the knock-on effect of this denial of equal moral citizenship to same-sex couples would be that children adopted by such a couple would also be denied equal moral citizenship because they would belong to a family that the state regards as inferior. This would, of course, be constitutionally untenable.
VI thInkIng / conclusIon
The fact that the first draft of the South African Civil Union Bill did not become legislation testifies to the strong commitment to constitutional democracy amongst a critical mass in South Africa. This commitment is in fact so strong that it successfully managed to weed out much of the overt totalitarianism that was visible for all to see during the legislative process. However, totalitarianism, like homophobia, does not evaporate like the morning dew -even where healthy institutions of democracy exist and strong commitment to them is undeniable. The ANC probably realised this when, as a matter of instrumental politics, it forced the vote of its members in Parliament in order to push the revised (and certainly not the ideal) 177 version of the Civil Union Bill through the legislature in order to meet the Constitutional Court's deadline. 178 Without an ongoing commitment to the rule of law (and its constitutive elements discussed here) in the context of the transformation of family law in South Africa, the legacy of totalitarianism will not be fully eradicated. It is indeed remarkable that South Africa is the only country on the continent (and one of few in the world) that now provides for same-sex marriage. What is, however, also remarkable is the fact that the Marriage Act 2 of 1961 (and it is significant that this is an Act that carries such a distinct date) remains on the statute books even though the Constitutional Court declared the Act and the common-law definition upon which it relied, unconstitutional.
179 That this represents a compromise (and perhaps even a concession to totalitarian impulses) should remain an important item on the agenda (and thus a motivating force) of all who feel themselves concerned with democracy, the rule of law and constitutionalism as a secular ethical discourse.
In conclusion, I would like to return to a dimension of Arendt's thought to which I have only referred to obliquely up to now, although this dimension is what ultimately underlies every single aspect of her theory of politics. It is the human faculty of reflective judgement, the inverse of which consists in what she calls 'thoughtlessness'. In The Human Condition Arendt expresses the belief that thoughtlessness is one of the most outstanding characteristics of our time. 180 She defines thoughtlessness as 'the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of "truths" that have become trivial and empty. ' 181 From this definition we can discern that thoughtlessness manifests in at least three forms: as heedless recklessness, as hopeless confusion or as the complacent repetition of 'truths'.
Before we can fruitfully apply the elements of this definition to the samesex marriage 'debate' in South Africa it is necessary to say two more things about thoughtlessness: one about what its political implications are and second, the specific meaning Arendt attributes to it in her report on the trial of Otto Adolf Eichmann. 182 On the political implications of thoughtlessness Arendt is clear. Thoughtlessness is what ultimately enables totalitarianism -it is what makes totalitarianism move forward in its crushing, all-encroaching fashion as the iron band of terror. Why is it particularly thoughtlessness that enables totalitarianism? Because thoughtlessness is that which renders evil banal ment that homosexuality is a psychological disorder. 193 All these 'truths' have been exposed as fallacies, became 'trivial and empty' many years ago and yet they were arrogantly put on exhibit (and hosted) in/on stages of processes that smacked unpleasantly of vitriol and naked, undisguised hatred.
As this article has shown, these instances of thoughtlessness are always closely connected with a totalitarian impulse which denies the most basic elements of a democratic politics and a constitutional order founded on the rule of law. However, the opposition to same-sex marriage could not avoid the fact that the South African Constitution does not and will not enable totalitarianism, because it not only 'requires that the law and public institutions acknowledge the variability of human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that should be shown to all as they are' 194 -it also demands of the South African people, at every turn, to stop and think. The fact that this demand is not always heard or obeyed does not take anything away from the fact that thinking (at the very least) from the standpoint of someone else remains the criterion by which conduct and process in South Africa will continue to be judged.
As a result of sheer intolerance (hatred (of democracy)), Arendt's vision of civic friendship has not yet come to fruition in South Africa. All over the country the space of appearance is threatened, the sharing of a common world continuously at risk. But as Arendt also contended, perhaps too optimistically, totalitarianism bears the germs of its own destruction in that it represents an anti-social (and thus unsustainable) situation destructive of the very thing that makes people human -living together. 19 And as every end undeniably and necessarily also contains a new beginning, the new beginning to which the Civil Union Act bears witness also testifies to the supreme capacity of the human -the ability to begin something new. 196 Rancière argues that 'the rights of man and of the citizen are the rights of those who make them a reality. They were won through democratic action and are only ever guaranteed through such action.' 197 Thus, while this joyous new beginning calls for much celebration, we need to remain at the wake of this time, for it must be thought of as a necessarily precarious time -a time that undeniably leaves us with what is perhaps the question of our age and thus a question that demands unbreachable responsibility: 'When will we be ready for an experience of freedom and equality that is capable of respectfully experiencing that friendship, which would at last be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against its measurelessness? O my democratic friends …' 198 
